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1. PROLOGUE
The invitation for this discussion contribution came
at the busiest time in my (professional) life with
four courses and many more meetings attempting
to compensate, psychologically, for the lost endow-
ment at Harvard. I could not possibly, however, de-
cline David Madigan’s kind invitation. The topic is
dear to my heart, as it should be to any statisti-
cian’s, for without “unobservables,” we would be
unemployable. And I always wanted to know what
“h-likelihood” is! I first heard the term from my aca-
demic twin brother, Andrew Gelman, who sent me
his discussion of Lee and Nelder (1996). Gelman’s
conclusion was that “To the extent that the meth-
ods in this paper give different answers from the
full Bayesian treatment, I would trust the latter.”
This of course did not entice me to read the pa-
per. Indeed, I still did not know its definition when
I started to type this Prologue, nor have I had any
professional or personal contact with either author.
I surmise this qualifies me as an objective discussant,
though I hope in this case the phrase objective is not
exchangeable with noninformative or ignorant !
But surely, one may quibble, Gelman’s comment
must have influenced me. True, but I’m not the kind
of Bayesian who is unwilling to change his/her prior.
My pure interest is to decode the h-likelihood. If my
brother is right, I’ll be more proud of him. If he is
wrong, I’ll be wiser by learning something new. (But
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I do ask Professors Lee and Nelder for their toler-
ance as I try to follow my brother’s critical style,
in the name of good discussion!) So here I am, set-
ting aside the 72-hour Memorial Day weekend, after
persuading my teenagers that their father’s H-bomb
mystery is more urgent to solve than his colleague
Dr. Langdon’s prevention of the antimatter explo-
sion in 24 hours, which actually repeats every week-
end.
2. PREPARING FOR A BAYESIAN
INFERENCE OF H-LIKELIHOOD
2.1 Prior Formulation
Naturally I will adopt a Bayesian approach to in-
fer what is the real “H” in the h-likelihood. What
could it actually stand for? (I) Heuristic argument?
(II) Handy approximation? (III) Hybrid method?
Or even (IV) Hidden treasure? Of course, a pri-
ori I would not be a good Bayesian if I exclude
“(V) Hype?” no matter how small my prior belief in
it. Gelman’s comment led me to assign the highest
prior probability to (III), 60%. Since the events here
are clearly not mutually exclusive, (I) and (II) also
deserve some nontrivial prior probabilities which are
40% each for reasons I can only explain to myself.
But for reasons everyone can explain, the prior prob-
abilities for categories such as (IV) or (V) are best
kept confidential, other than that they of course de-
pend on one’s knowledge of the author(s) and the
journal.
2.2 Data Collection
Immediately, I ran into the usual problem of any
real-life data collection—there are never enough time
or resources! It is already 2:31 pm Saturday as I
am typing this sentence, and I yet need to read
the paper plus four reference papers I was able to
download from JSTOR: two discussion papers by
the same authors (Lee and Nelder, 1996, 2005) and
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the two papers in Biometrika that illustrate the
use of h-likelihood (Ha, Lee and Song, 2001, Lee
and Nelder, 2001). Lee, Nelder and Pawitan’s (2006)
book of course would be invaluable which, unfor-
tunately, turns out to be literally true in this case
because apparently no Harvard library can afford it.
So I settle with these four papers as background,
knowing well the potential bias due to my haphazard
selection and all the “unobservables” to me at this
moment. Hence my apologies to the authors—and
readers—in advance. To compensate for my hasti-
ness, I’ll actually read all five papers, and the discus-
sions, before forming my likelihood, with or without
“H”!
2.3 Data Processing
Another grand challenge in real-life statistical anal-
ysis is data processing, something that unfortunately
has not received nearly enough systematic treatment
in the literature but which typically can have a sub-
stantial, if not detrimental, impact on the final con-
clusions. One key component in data processing is
to sort out contradictions in the data, some obvious
and some subtle.
A priori I did not expect this to be a part of the
mystery that would await me. But that prior be-
lief quickly shrank to ε after reading the first para-
graph. The authors started by emphasizing Pear-
son’s (1920) point that Fisher’s likelihood is not use-
ful for predicting future observations or unobserv-
ables. Regardless of whether Fisher ever had such
an intention, this is an inference/prediction issue.
The authors then immediately stated that existing
efforts in generalizing Fisher’s likelihood inferences
with unobservables run into the problem of not hav-
ing “explicit forms” due to the difficult in integra-
tion. But that is squarely a computational/calculus
issue. Putting aside the vast literature on the EM
algorithm and related computational methods that
have successfully dealt with this very computational
issue in many common applications (see the overview
by van Dyk and Meng (2010) and other papers in
the coming theme issue on EM in this journal), I am
mystified by the logic and aims here—which issue do
the authors intend to address? Both?
Of course this could actually be a sign of a great
mystery novel, enticing the reader from the very
beginning, with multiple seemingly related or unre-
lated lines to pursue, and a Holy Grail at the end—
a gigantic H! (Clearly I am still in my Dan Brown
mood, though hopefully this time the Holy Grail is
more than a legend.)
The data processing indeed took much longer than
I expected, mainly because the “unobservables” that
I need to infer, from a number of mystic symbols
whose meaning can only be surmised retrospectively
to reasons that can explain the authors’ conviction
that their h-likelihood methods have been misunder-
stood by almost all the discussants, since Lee and
Nelder (1996).
It is already 6:39 pm, Sunday. So let me get to the
three main storylines as I comprehend. The first two
lines are generally well understood, so I shall reflect
on them briefly. The third line, which is the most
controversial, namely, h-likelihood inference for un-
observables, touches upon some fundamental issues
about statistical inference and prediction, and turns
out to have at least one unexpected intriguing prop-
erty, at least to me. Therefore, the rest (three quar-
ters of the) discussion attempts to provide an ex-
planation of this controversy to a general audience,
along with some ramifications and thoughts it gen-
erates. Indeed, if a reader is in a rush to catch An-
gles and Demons, as my teenagers were, the reader
should just skip the following section, which con-
tains no real enlightenment or entertainment, other
than some shameless self-advertisements and aca-
demic quibbles.
3. TWO UNCONTROVERSIAL STORYLINES
3.1 Line One: Unobservables are Useful
for Modeling
Much of the authors’ Section 1 and Section 2 were
devoted to arguing and demonstrating the useful-
ness of unobservables for statistical modeling. Other
than the authors’ preference for using unobservables
as the all-encompassing term instead of the more
common term missing data (though I agree that
“unobservables” is semantically more appropriate),
the same message has been repeatedly emphasized
in the literature, and it is indeed worthy of repeat-
ing. As I wrote in “Missing Data: Dial M for ???”,
a JASA Y2K vignette (Meng, 2000), “The topic of
missing data is as old and as extensive as statistics
itself—after all, statistics is about knowing the un-
knowns.” Unable to outshine the summary there,
I ask readers’ indulgence for a more extensive self-
quotation. Below is the opening paragraph of the
same vignette, echoing well the authors’ key em-
phases, but with a more extended history (e.g., McK-
endrick’s missing-data modeling/formulation went
back 1926; see Meng, 1997):
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The question mark is common notation
for the missing data that occur in most
applied statistical analyses. Over the past
century, statisticians and other scientists
not only have invented numerous methods
for handling missing/incomplete data, but
also have invented many forms of missing
data, including data augmentation, hid-
den states, latent variables, potential out-
come, and auxiliary variables. Purposely
constructing unobserved/unobservable vari-
ables offers an extraordinarily flexible and
powerful framework for both scientific mod-
eling and computation and is one of the
central statistical contributions to natu-
ral, engineering, and social sciences. In par-
allel, much research has been devoted to
better understanding and modeling of real-
life missing-data mechanisms; that is, the
unintended data selection process that pre-
vents us from observing our intended data.
This article is a very brief and personal
tour of these developments, and thus nec-
essarily has much missing history and ci-
tations. The tour consists of a number of
Ms, starting with a historic story of the
mysterious method of McKendrick for an-
alyzing an epidemic study and its link to
the EM algorithm, the most popular and
powerful method of the twentieth century
for fitting models involving missing data
and latent variables. The remaining Ms
touch on theoretical, methodological and
practical aspects of missing-data problems,
highlighted with some common applica-
tions in social, computational, biological,
medical and physical sciences.
No further discussion seems necessary because this
is a point on which apparently most agree; indeed,
almost all the positive comments on Lee and Nelder
(1996) were on praising their promotion and formu-
lation of models via unobservables.
3.2 Line Two: H-likelihood for Fixed Parameter
The authors’ Section 3 is where I saw the defi-
nition of h-likelihood for the first time. Using the
authors’ initial notation, y denotes observed data, θ
is the fixed parameter, and v I infer is what the au-
thors regarded as a random “unobservable.” The h-
loglikelihood is simply defined as h(θ, v) = log fθ(y, v)
where fθ(y, v) is the joint probability distribution/
density of {y, v}.
In the rejoinder of Lee and Nelder (1996), the au-
thors argued that the definition of h-likelihood is as
logical as Fisher’s likelihood. I agree. In fact, this
point was well recognized in Berger and Wolpert’s
(1988) monograph on likelihood principle (LP) where
they wrote (page 21.2), “. . . the LP should be formu-
lated in such a way that θ consists of all unknown
variables and parameters that are relevant to the
statistical problem.” (Emphasis is original.) They
proceeded to devote an entire section to the suc-
cesses and challenges in extending the LP to include
what they call “unobservable variables,” just as in
the authors’ formulation. In fact, in addition to the
observable X , they wrote (pages 36–37) θ = (z;ω) =
(y,w; ξ, η), “where z = (y,w) is the value of an un-
observable variable Z with y being of interest and
w being a nuisance variable, and where ω = (ξ, η)
is the parameter that determines the distribution of
both X and Z, with ξ being of interest and η be-
ing a nuisance parameter.” This quote shows that
Berger and Wolpert’s (1988) definition is the same
as the authors’, other than it takes a more explicit
form by recognizing two different kinds of unobserv-
ables, y and w, just as we often distinguish between
primary parameter ξ and nuisance parameter η.
The key question here, therefore, is what to do
with it once it is defined. I shall discuss this point
in Section 5. Here it suffices to note that the au-
thors’ initial proposal to maximize h(θ, v) jointly
over {θ, v}, which they label MHLE (maximum h-
likelihood estimation) as in Section 2.2 of Lee and
Nelder (1996), can clearly lead to grossly inconstant
or even meaningless estimators if it is taken as a
general procedure. This was pointed out by the ma-
jority of the discussants of Lee and Nelder (1996);
as the authors stated later in the rejoinder of Lee
and Nelder (2005), “The discussion was a disaster
because everybody took the worst possible case of
binary data and described difficulties with it. No-
body said it worked in other cases.” The example
of Bayarri et al. (1988), reviewed in authors’ Sec-
tion 4.2, demonstrated that the defect has little to
do with binary data.
Indeed, earlier Little and Rubin (1983) provided
four examples, three using standard univariate or
bivariate (regression) normal models and one with
a censored exponential model, to show that MHLE
(though of course not in that term since Little and
Rubin, 1983 predates Lee and Nelder, 1996) resulted
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in seriously flawed/inconsistent estimators, unless
the amount of missing data is (asymptotically) neg-
ligible. The underlying issue is essentially the same
as with the well-known Neyman–Scott problem (Ney-
man and Scott, 1948). The message here is loud and
clear: maximizing over unobservable/missing data,
in general, is not a valid method.
Evidently, the message has been appreciated by
the authors, as they now make it explicit that for
the “fixed parameters,” their method is the same
as Fisher’s MLE, that is, maximizing the marginal
log likelihood ℓ(θ) = log fθ(y). This certainly should
help to avoid the type of mis-communications the
authors described in the paper (e.g., about Rubin
and Little’s 2002 comments). But this also means
that no further discussion is needed either because
there is no new advance here.
However, for the sake of discussion, let me pick
up on the authors’ statement that “We view the
marginal likelihood as an adjusted profile likelihood
eliminating nuisance unobservables v from the h-
likelihood.” The issue is not much of the re-labeling
itself, but rather that by making such a statement,
the authors might be in danger of falling into the
same trap that they have correctly warned others
to avoid. The authors’ “adjusted profile h-likelihood
(APHL),” as far as I am able to understand, simply
uses a Laplace approximation to replace the inte-
gration called for by Bayesian marginalization (for
nuisance parameter/unobservables). Whereas such
an approximation indeed is very useful and appeal-
ing for practical purposes when the approximation is
reasonable, it does not constitute a principled sta-
tistical method in its own right unless a sound infer-
ential principle is articulated for the approximation
itself. Without such a principle, its performance can
only be judged by how close the approximation is to
the Bayesian target it approximates. In this sense,
comparisons such as those given in the authors’ Fig-
ure 2 say little about the merit of the h-likelihood
methods, but only reconfirm the usefulness of the
Laplace approximations, or demonstrate the impact
of the prior (which of course is not a part of the
h-likelihood formulation). In other words, mixing a
computation/approximation method with a statisti-
cal method is as troublesome to me as mixing an
estimation method with a statistical model is to the
authors (and to me of course).
Enough painless/itchless quibbles; let us get to the
heart of the authors’ proposal, that is, making in-
ference about the unobservables via h-likelihood!
4. WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPLES BEHIND
THE H-LIKELIHOOD METHODS?
4.1 Distinguishing Likelihood Principle,
Likelihood Inference, and MLE
The authors invoked several times the likelihood
principle (LP) to justify their h-likelihood methods.
But all the LP says, broadly speaking, is that if two
data sets lead to the same likelihood, then they con-
tain the same information, assuming the underlying
model for each data set is correctly specified. The LP
eliminates any procedure that violates it, but it says
nothing about how to conduct a likelihood inference.
As Berger and Wolpert [(1988), Chapter 5] put it,
“The LP strikes us as correct, and behaving in vi-
olation of it would be a source of considerable dis-
comfort. Yet the LP does not tell one what to do (al-
though insisting on methods based on the observed
likelihood function certainly reduces the possibili-
ties).”
Indeed, there is a long list of methods in the do-
main of “utilization of the likelihood function,” too
long even for Berger and Wolpert’s (1988) mono-
graph. I shall avoid repeating Berger and Wolpert’s
argument that the full Bayesian inference is actu-
ally the most principled likelihood inference, since
clearly the authors’ intention here is to achieve what
Bayesian methods achieve but without adopting the
Bayesian philosophy; or, to self quote again (Meng,
2008), “enjoying the Bayesian fruits without paying
the B-club fee.” But it is worthwhile to re-emphasize
that the notion of likelihood inference is a very elu-
sive one—any method that does not violate LP can
be legitimately included (see Berger and Wolpert,
1988).
In contrast, maximal likelihood estimation (MLE)
is a well-defined method, telling us exactly what to
do with the likelihood function. It is this specific
method that the authors’ MHLE mimics. The afore-
mentioned counterexamples demonstrate clearly that
in general this imitation is only mathematical. The key
question then is whether it is possible to find a set of
useful and general conditions under which the im-
itation is more fundamental, that is, under which
MHLE preserves the underlying properties of MLE
that guarantee its validity and efficiency? The an-
swer turns out to be an intriguing “yes and NO.”
But before we get to that punch line, we will need
the wisdom of an old friend, Mr. Bartlett.
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4.2 Do Bartlett Identities Hold for H-likelihood?
Finding themost likely parameter value that could
have produced the observed data is intuitively very
appealing—what else could be better? But of course
as statisticians we know such reasoning by itself is
flawed, because it puts us squarely in the hands of
the Devil of Overfitting! There is clearly much more
to Fisher’s MLE than this flawed intuition.
Probabilistically, a backbone of Fisher’s ML
method is the Bartlett identities, especially the first
two. That is, for the (marginal) log-likelihood ℓ(θ;y),
under the usual regularity condition that the sup-
port of fθ(y) does not depend on θ ∈Θ, we have
Eθ
[
∂ℓ(θ;y)
∂θ
]
= 0 ∀θ ∈Θ,(4.1)
Eθ
[
∂2ℓ(θ;y)
∂θ2
]
+Eθ
[(
∂ℓ(θ;y)
∂θ
)(
∂ℓ(θ;y)
∂θ
)⊤]
(4.2)
= 0 ∀θ ∈Θ
where Eθ denotes the expectation under fθ(y). Here
identity (4.1) guarantees that the normal/score equa-
tion underlying the MLE method,
S(θ;y)≡
∂ℓ(θ;y)
∂θ
= 0,(4.3)
is an unbiased estimating equation. Identity (4.2) is
the basis for the asymptotic efficiency of MLE (un-
der regularity conditions, of course) because it re-
duces the general “sandwich” variance formula to
the inverse of Fisher information, the Crame´r–Rao
lower bound.
For these reasons, generalizations of (maximal)
likelihood methods have largely tried to preserve
these two identities, such as with the quasi-likelihood
method (e.g., McCullagh and Nelder, 1989, Chapter
9); see Mykland (1994, 1999) for other examples. It
is therefore difficult to imagine that the issue of pre-
serving them has not been investigated in general in
the context of h-likelihood, given it is essentially a
minimal requirement; indeed, when Engle and Keen,
the lead discussants of Lee and Nelder (1996), wrote,
“. . . the usual first- and second moment properties
exactly hold for h-scores, for example, for normal-
normal and Poisson-Gamma models. . . ” I believe
they were referring to the two identities above. I
therefore surmise that it is my haphazardly selec-
tive reading that makes the existing investigations
unobservable to me. So I must offer my apologies to
anyone, especially the authors, if I am reinventing
the wheel below. But in any case I hope the mate-
rial presented in the rest of this discussion will help
to establish a firmer theoretical ground for inves-
tigating the virtues and limitations of MHLE and
other h-likelihood methods.
Specifically, as we all know, identities (4.1) and
(4.2) are consequences of∫
Ωy
eℓ(θ;y)µ(dy) =
∫
Ωy
fθ(y)µ(dy) = 1
(4.4)
∀θ ∈Θ
by repeatedly differentiating under the integral sign
with respect to θ, which is legitimate when the sup-
port Ωy is free of θ (and assuming the usual continu-
ous differentiability of ℓ(θ;y) as a function of θ; such
conditions will be assumed below whenever needed).
For log h-likelihood, h(θ, v;y) = log fθ(y, v), clearly
we still have∫
Ωy,v
eh(θ,v;y)µ(dy, dv)
(4.5)
=
∫
Ωy,v
fθ(y, v)µ(dy, dv) = 1 ∀θ ∈Θ.
However, whereas we can still take (partial) deriva-
tives with respect to θ on both sides of (4.5) to ar-
rive at useful identities, obviously taking the deriva-
tive of both sides with respect to v would produce
0 = 0. This death of the old trick signifies a key dif-
ference between the h-likelihood and Fisher’s likeli-
hood, even if we put aside cases where v is discrete
and hence taking derivatives is not even an option.
Here we remark that unlike Fisher’s likelihood where
discrete parameters are rare (other than with model
selection problems), discrete unobservable/missing
data are common which poses an additional chal-
lenge to the MHLE method. But clearly the authors’
current proposal focuses on continuous v, so we will
proceed in this setting.
5. ENCOURAGING NEWS: H-LIKELIHOOD
IS BARTLIZABLE
5.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
Bartlett Identities
Without the old trick, we have to directly inves-
tigate if and when (4.1) and (4.2) can be extended
to h-likelihood. Specifically, when we let φ= {θ, v},
and write
h(φ;y) = log fθ(y|v) + log fθ(v),(5.1)
6 X.-L. MENG
we see the “troublemaker” is the second term be-
cause for the first term, v plays the same role of
a fixed parameter for the conditional distribution
fθ(y|v), and hence the old trick of differentiating
under integration is applicable. In particular, as an
application of (4.1) and (4.2) when conditioning on
v and assuming the support of fθ(y|v) does not de-
pend on either θ or v, we have, for any θ ∈Θ,
Eθ
[
∂ log fθ(y|v)
∂φ
∣∣∣v]= 0,(5.2)
Eθ
[
∂2 log fθ(y|v)
∂φ2
∣∣∣v]
+Eθ
[(
∂ log fθ(y|v)
∂φ
)(
∂ log fθ(y|v)
∂φ
)⊤∣∣∣v](5.3)
= 0.
Consequently, under the additional assumption that
the support of fθ(v) does not depend on θ, (5.1) and
(5.2) imply that, for any θ ∈Θ,
Eθ
[
∂h(φ;y)
∂φ
]
=Eθ
[
∂ log fθ(v)
∂φ
]
=
(
0
Eθ
[
∂ log fθ(v)
∂v
])
(5.4)
≡

 0∫
Ωv
∂fθ(v)
∂v
µ(dv)

 .
Furthermore, noting that the cross terms in the
quadratic expansion below are zero by first condi-
tioning on v, we have from (5.1)–(5.3),
Eθ
[
∂2h(φ;y)
∂φ2
]
+Eθ
[(
∂h(φ;y)
∂φ
)(
∂h(φ;y)
∂φ
)⊤]
=Eθ
[
∂2 log fθ(v)
∂φ2
]
(5.5)
+Eθ
[(
∂ log fθ(v)
∂φ
)(
∂ log fθ(v)
∂φ
)⊤]
≡
(
A B
B⊤ C
)
.
In the above expression,
A=Eθ
[
∂2 log fθ(v)
∂θ2
]
(5.6)
+Eθ
[(
∂ log fθ(v)
∂θ
)(
∂ log fθ(v)
∂θ
)⊤]
= 0
by applying (4.2) to log fθ(v). For the term B, one
can easily verify that
B = Eθ
[
∂2 log fθ(v)
∂θ ∂v
]
+Eθ
[(
∂ log fθ(v)
∂θ
)(
∂ log fθ(v)
∂v
)⊤]
(5.7)
=
∂
∂θ
{
Eθ
[(
∂ log fθ(v)
∂v
)⊤]}
∀θ ∈Θ,
and hence it will also be zero if Eθ[
∂ log fθ(v)
∂v ] = 0 for
all θ ∈Θ. Finally, simple algebra shows
C =Eθ
[
∂2 log fθ(v)
∂v2
+
(
∂ log fθ(v)
∂v
)(
∂ log fθ(v)
∂v
)⊤]
(5.8)
≡
∫
Ωv
∂2fθ(v)
∂v2
µ(dv).
Combining (5.4)–(5.8) yields the following straight-
forward but key result.
Theorem 1. Let h(φ;y) = log fθ(y, v) be a log
h-likelihood where φ= {θ, v}, θ ∈Θ is the model pa-
rameter, v is a continuous unobservable with density
fθ(v) with respect to a measure µ, and let Sθ(v) =
∂ log fθ(v)
∂v . Furthermore, assume the support of fθ(y|v)
does not depend on either θ or v (almost surely with
respect to µ), the support of fθ(v), denoted by Ωv, is
free of θ, and all continuity and differentiability con-
ditions hold whenever needed. Then the first Bartlett
identity holds for the h-likelihood, that is
Eθ
[
∂h(φ;y)
∂φ
]
= 0 ∀θ ∈Θ(5.9)
if and only if
Eθ[Sθ(v)]≡
∫
Ωv
∂fθ(v)
∂v
µ(dv) = 0 ∀θ ∈Θ.(5.10)
Assuming (5.10), then the second Bartlett identity
holds for the h-likelihood; that is,
Eθ
[
∂2h(φ;y)
∂φ2
]
+Eθ
[(
∂h(φ;y)
∂φ
)(
∂h(φ;y)
∂φ
)⊤]
(5.11)
= 0 ∀θ ∈Θ
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if and only if
Eθ
[
∂Sθ(v)
∂v
+ Sθ(v)S
⊤
θ (v)
]
(5.12)
≡
∫
Ωv
∂2fθ(v)
∂v2
µ(dv) = 0 ∀θ ∈Θ.
5.2 Yes: It is Easy for H-likelihood to Produce
“Un-sandwiched” Estimating Equation
Theorem 1 is somewhat remarkable because the
necessary and sufficient conditions (5.10) and (5.12)
are determined purely by the marginal distribution
of the unobservable v, and hence they are easy to
check. For example, in Bayarri’s example quoted by
the authors, the marginal density of the unobserv-
able u is exponential with mean λ = θ−1. Conse-
quently, Sθ(u) = −θ, and hence condition (5.10) is
violated for all θ > 0, as is condition (5.12). This
means that whenever u is used for the h-likelihood,
the resulting h-score will never form an unbiased es-
timating equation, regardless of the model for fθ(y|u)!
Indeed, we have seen from the authors’ Section 4.2
that the corresponding MHLE leads to meaningless
estimates.
In contrast, when we use v = logu, fθ(v) = θe
v−θev ,
and hence Sθ(v) = 1 − θe
v = 1 − u/λ and S ′θ(v) +
S2θ (v) =−θe
v+(1−θu)2 =−u/λ+(u−λ)2/λ2. Both
conditions (5.10) and (5.12) then follow trivially be-
cause Eθ(u) = λ and Vθ(u) = λ
2. Consequently, the
authors’ h-score is not only an unbiased estimating
equation but also an “optimal” one in the sense that
we do not need the usual “sandwich” formula, but
only the Hessian matrix, for “valid” variance esti-
mation. Unfortunately, I have to put both “optimal”
and “valid” in quotes because of the bad news I will
deliver in the next section. But as far as for preserv-
ing Bartlett identities goes, which by itself does not
guarantee valid statistical inferences, I can share the
authors’ optimism for the future of MHLE, espe-
cially because of the following somewhat even more
surprising result, which says that conditions (5.10)
and (5.12) hold quite easily for many unobservables
or their simple transformations.
Theorem 2. Under the same setting as in The-
orem 1, suppose the support of fθ(v), Ωv ⊂R
d, takes
a rectangle form, Ωv =
∏d
j=1[aj , bj], where aj or bj
is permitted to take the value of +∞ or −∞. Let
∂Ωv be the boundary set of Ωv (i.e., the set of all
points whose coordinates contain at least one aj or
bj), and assume the dominating measure µ is the
Lebesgue measure on Rd. We then have:
(I) If fθ(v) = 0 for all v ∈ ∂Ωv, then condition
(5.10) holds, and hence the first Bartlett identity
(5.9) holds.
(II) If in addition ∂fθ(v)∂v = 0 also holds for all
v ∈ ∂Ωv, then condition (5.12) holds, and hence the
second Bartlett identity (5.11) holds.
Proof. For (I), because of (5.10), if v is univari-
ate, that is, if d= 1, then∫
Ωv
∂fθ(v)
∂v
dv =
∫ b1
a1
dfθ(v)
= fθ(b1)− fθ(a1)(5.13)
= 0,
under our assumption that fθ(v) vanishes on the
boundary. For d > 1, we apply the same argument
to each of the d integrations that form the leftmost
vector in (5.13), that is,
∫
Ωv
∂fθ(v)
∂vk
dv, k = 1, . . . , d, by
integrating with respect to vk first to conclude that
it is zero for all θ.
For (II), we first note that for any {k, s},
Ik,s ≡
∫
Ωv
∂2fθ(v)
∂vk ∂vs
dv
(5.14)
=
∫
Ωv
∂
∂vk
(
∂fθ(v)
∂vs
)
dv.
Hence, using the same argument as above but with
fθ(v) replaced by
∂fθ(v)
∂vs
, we can conclude Ik,s = 0
for all k, s= 1, . . . , d. Consequently, condition (5.12)
holds. 
What this result says is that as long as the marginal
density of the unobservable v vanishes on the bound-
ary of its support, the first Bartlett identity holds
for h-likelihood. In addition, if its derivative also
vanishes on the boundary, then the second Bartlett
identity holds. This provides an even easier way to
verify Bayarri’s example. For the original unobserv-
able u, fθ(u) = θe
−θu, with boundary points u = 0
and u=∞. But since fθ(0) = θ, the vanishing con-
dition is violated as long as θ > 0. In contrast, for
v = logu, fθ(v) = θe
v−θev , with boundary points v =
−∞ and v =+∞. It is easy to see that fθ(−∞) =
fθ(+∞) = 0 for all θ. Furthermore, since
∂fθ(v)
∂v
= θ(ev−θe
v
− θe2v−θe
v
),
the derivative also vanishes at both v = −∞ and
v =∞. Therefore, both Bartlett identities hold for
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h-likelihood when v = logu is used as the unobserv-
able. For simplicity, we will label the process of find-
ing a transformation that makes Bartlett identities
hold Bartlization (“Bartlettlization” is too much of
a tongue twister!).
An astute reader may have noticed that I did not
say that failing the vanishing condition is the rea-
son for the failing of the Bartlett identities for the
original scale u. The vanishing condition is suffi-
cient, but not necessary. This can easily been seen in
(5.13), which only requires fθ(a1) = fθ(b1). Indeed,
the Bartlett identity fails for the original scale u pre-
cisely because fθ(u = +∞) = 0 but fθ(u = 0) = θ,
and hence Eθ[Sθ(u)] = 0 − θ = −θ, as verified di-
rectly previously. A necessary and sufficient condi-
tion via integration on ∂Ωv is not hard to obtain,
but it requires a bit more mathematical treatment
than is needed for most practical applications, for
which Theorem 2 is adequate. Here we just mention
that we can generalize Theorem 2 by allowing Ωv
to be an arbitrary simply connected manifold in Rd
(i.e., a manifold with “no hole”), and then invoke
the generalized Stokes’ theorem (see Marsden and
Tromba, 2003) to equate the integration of dw on
Ωv to that of w on the boundary ∂Ωv where w is a
so-called d− 1 differential form which can be taken
in terms of fθ(v) or its derivative as needed.
The authors stated in the rejoinder of Lee and
Nelder (2005) that “We do not say that the cur-
rent h-likelihood method will always perform the
best, but we believe that it can always be modi-
fied to give an improvement, as has been done with
Fisher’s likelihood method.” I believe the alluded-to
improvements lie in using higher order Bartlett iden-
tities, such as the third identity for “Bartlett correc-
tion” for the likelihood ratio tests (e.g., McCullagh,
1987). Clearly Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 have their
higher order generalizations, but it is already 9:14
pm of the second Sunday. My teenagers’ visit to Dr.
Langdon is already postponed for another week, so
I had better leave such generalizations to a future
paper. More importantly, as much as I am enjoying
discovering the “Bartlizability” of h-likelihood, I do
not see a way to correct the more fundamental prob-
lem described in the next section, which potentially
makes “Bartlett-corrected h-likelihood” an exercise
that is literally just a homework exercise.
6. BAD NEWS AND A PUZZLE:
FISHY OR FIDUCIAL?
6.1 NO: It is Hard for log H-likelihood to be
Summarizable Quadratically
Having the Bartlett identities is only a part of
the story. What it guarantees is that if the log h-
likelihood can be approximated quadratically, then
the mode and the Hessian matrix derived from it
will provide an approximately correct estimator and
its associated (inverse) variance. To examine this is-
sue more clearly, let us mimic the formal asymptotic
argument behind the estimating equation approach
which relies on the expression
φˆ− φ= I−1h (θ)S(φ;y) +R,(6.1)
where φˆ is the MHLE, S(φ;y) = ∂h(φ;y)∂φ is the h-
score, and Ih(θ) is the h-likelihood extension of the
expected Fisher information, the expected Hessian,
Ih(θ)≡Eθ
[
−
∂2h(φ;y)
∂φ2
]
.(6.2)
We emphasize here that unlike the original Fisher
information, Ih(θ) is not generally guaranteed to be
positive definite (so I−1h (θ) may not even exist) un-
less condition (5.12) holds; see Section 7 for an ex-
ample.
Expression (6.1) by itself is tautological, because
there is always an R to make it hold; in particular
it can be derived from a remainder term in the Tay-
lor expansion of S(φˆ;y) − S(φ;y). However, when
R is (asymptotically) negligible, (6.1) allows us to
conclude that the distribution of φˆ− φ can be ap-
proximated by that of T (θ;y)≡ I−1h (θ)S(φ;y) which
has mean zero when the first Bartlett identity holds
and variance I−1h (θ) when the second Bartlett iden-
tity holds.
When h is a regular Fisher’s likelihood, under reg-
ularity conditions, the R term is asymptotically neg-
ligible compared with the first term on the right-
hand side of (6.1). A key reason for this is the ac-
cumulation of information as we collect more data;
eventually we will have zero uncertainty about the
parameter, at least in theory. Unfortunately, for h-
likelihood, this cannot be true in general even in
theory because no matter how much data we accu-
mulate, it cannot possibly eliminate the uncertainty,
say, in predicting a future outcome, such as in the
authors’ Example 4. This lack of accumulation of
information for unobservables is essentially the key
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problem pointed out by multiple discussants (e.g.,
both lead discussants) of Lee and Nelder (1996),
with both theoretical and empirical examples.
Without the accumulation of information to jus-
tify the central limit theorem or the law of large
numbers, we actually will run into two problems
with the standard asymptotic arguments for (6.1),
even if the first two Bartlett identities hold. The most
obvious and critical one is that since R is not negligi-
ble, we cannot approximate the distribution of φˆ−φ
by that of T (θ;y) = I−1h (θ)S(φ;y); indeed, without
R being negligible, the MHLEs are not guaranteed
to be consistent, as in all examples of Little and
Rubin (1983). It is of critical importance to stress
that the Bartlizable property of h-likelihood itself
has little bearing on the issue of being quadratically
summarizable, that is, the R term being negligible.
Indeed, in all normal examples of Little and Ru-
bin (1983), the h-likelihood is naturally Bartlized
because clearly the normal density and any of its
derivatives vanish on the boundary of its support,
yet the MHLE produces inconsistent estimators be-
cause of the nonnegligibility of the R term. The more
subtle one is that regardless of whether R is negli-
gible or not, we may not be able to justify the usual
normal approximation T (θ;y)∼ N(0, I−1h (θ)), even
if T (θ;y) has mean zero and variance matrix I−1h (θ).
(Of course, when R is not negligible, the properties
of T are not really relevant.) Section 7 will illustrate
all these points via a simple but very informative ex-
ample.
6.2 And a Puzzle: The Meaning of the
H-distribution
Even if R is exactly zero and all Bartlett identi-
ties hold, the h-likelihood method, as a method for
predicting the unobservables v, still faces a funda-
mental challenge. That is, what is the meaning of
the resulting distribution f(v|y), which I shall term
the h-distribution for obvious reasons? If one is will-
ing to assume a constant prior on θ, then of course
this has a Bayesian interpretation as a posterior pre-
dictive distribution or an approximation to it. But
the authors specifically emphasized that they did
not want to specify a prior on θ, for their goal is
to provide an alternative method to the Bayesian
approach.
Some Bayesians may be agitated by having a
method that is mathematically or numerically equiv-
alent, in general, to a Bayes method (perhaps un-
der a particular prior), but is labeled as something
else. I am much less troubled, provided that (1) the
connection is clearly spelled out, and (2) there is
a well-articulated non-Bayesian principle justifying
the method. The authors clearly have done (1), but
for (2) all I can find is authors’ desire to conduct a
probabilistic inference for v without having to spec-
ify a prior for θ. At the conceptual level, I have the
very same desire because of my frustration, which I
am sure some share, with the apparent impossibility
of constructing a truly “noninformative” prior (for
continuous parameters, at least). I also very much
appreciate the authors’ emphasis that the “plug-in”
empirical Bayes is not a satisfying method, precisely
because “plug-in” is an ad hoc method. So indeed I
was quite excited when I thought that the authors
had found a way to meaningfully specify a proba-
bilistic f(v|y), without considering θ as a random
variable.
At a practical level, the authors did provide a
number of “well-specified” h-distributions, either via
(the implied) normal approximation with mean and
variance obtained from the MHLE/Hessian matrix
for v or the APHL approximation by profiling out
θ. But without spelling out the probabilistic mean-
ing of such resulting distributions, it is essentially
impossible to answer the criticism that the label
of h-likelihood is a red herring because they are
just approximations to Bayesian solutions instead
of the products of a genuine competing method as
claimed. More importantly, without knowing what
“gold standard” they aim to approximate, we have
no meaningful ways to evaluate how good the ap-
proximations are, or even to specify a probabilistic
evaluation mechanism; in what real or thought ex-
periment can it be realized?
Indeed, the lack of a distinct and justifiable mean-
ing of the h-distribution apparently has put the au-
thors in an awkward position in terms of demon-
strating the merit of their methods. From the pa-
pers I read, it appears that the authors have two
kinds of comparisons. The first is to compare an h-
distribution to a Bayesian one, and to “validate”
the h-distribution by showing how close it is to the
Bayesian counterpart. But this only strengthens the
aforementioned “red herring” criticism, and provides
evidence for—not against—the kind of statements
made by my twin brother quoted previously. Clearly
this is contrary to the authors’ intention, and I be-
lieve is part of the reasons for the continuing dis-
crepancy between the authors’ enthusiasm for and
others’ reluctance toward the h-likelihood methods.
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The second type is something that I have not
seen before, at least not in academic publications.
The authors seem to take their methods as the stan-
dard, and compared everything else to it, as sug-
gested by the statement, “In the salamander data,
among other methods considered, the MCEM of
Vaida and Meng (2005) gives the closest estimates
to the h-likelihood estimators.” Such comparisons
would be meaningful if the superiority of the h-
likelihood results had already been demonstrated
either by theoretical proof (e.g., optimality of some
sort) or by a distinctive principle that is not sub-
sumed or invalidated by accepted ones. But even in
such cases, the value of this type of comparison is to
demonstrate the performance of other methods, not
the merit of the h-likelihood method itself.
6.3 Fiducial Argument via Predictive
Pivotal Quantity?
As I tried in vain to form a thought experiment
that would meaningfully define the h-distribution
f(v|y) without slipping into the Bayesian mode, I
looked hard into the authors’ writings for clues about
what they had in mind. The first clue came from
Section 3.1 of Lee and Nelder (1996), where they
showed that, in the context of the models they were
investigating, a log h-likelihood expression in their
(3.2) can be expanded into their expression (3.3)
which is a quadratic term −(v˜− v)′D∗(v˜− v)/2 plus
a term that depends on y only (their v˜ is the same
as the vˆ notation here). They then wrote, “Ignoring
the constant term, which depends only on y and not
on v, expressions (3.2) and (3.3) imply that
v|y ∼N(v˜,D∗−1)
would be a good approximation for the distribution
of v|y.” With apologies to the authors in case I mis-
understand their notation or there was a misprint-
ing, this reasoning smells either fishy or fiducial, de-
pending on the meaning of “the distribution of v|y.”
First, if by “the distribution of v|y” is meant the
sampling distribution of v given both y and θ, then
the reasoning underlying the above statement would
contain the elementary flaw of confusing a marginal
distribution of X1 −X2 with the conditional distri-
bution of X1−X2 given X1. This is because, even if
the normal approximation is justified, the quadratic
term above is for the marginal distribution of v˜− v,
as v and v˜, which is a function of y only, vary jointly
according to f(y;v|θ). [I switch the notation from
fθ(y;v) to f(y;v|θ) to emphasize the conditioning on
θ, even though the latter notation may imply that θ
is a variable being conditioned upon, something the
authors’ approach aims to avoid.] This marginal dis-
tribution clearly is not the same, in general, as the
conditional distribution f(v˜− v|v˜, θ) or f(v˜− v|y, θ)
(note in general that these two distributions are also
different unless y and v are independent given θ).
This can be most clearly seen from (6.1) where all
the distributional calculations are with respect to
the joint distribution f(y;v|θ), not the conditional
distribution f(v|y; θ).
Of course, this is unlikely to be what the authors
intended, since their goal is to capture v|y without
conditioning on θ. But the notation f(v|y) has no
definition or meaning under the authors’ joint mod-
eling specification f(y, v|θ) because θ is treated as
fixed. This brings me to the second “smell,” that is,
the authors were invoking a fiducial-like argument,
by implicitly defining their conditional h-distribution
v|y as the sampling marginal distribution of vˆ−v un-
der the joint distribution f(y, v|θ), and getting rid of
its dependence on θ when vˆ− v is (asymptotically)
a predictive pivotal quantity, meaning that its distri-
bution is free of any unknowns. We can also think
of this way of eliminating the nuisance parameter
θ for the purpose of prediction as seeking predictive
ancillarity, that is, a function of both y and v whose
distribution is free of θ. See the example in Section 7
for an illustration.
6.4 A Duality or Prestidigitation?
The second piece of evidence from the authors’
writing seems to confirm this interpretation. In the
comparisons of their methods with the Empirical
Bayesian method, they compared the Bayesian pos-
terior predictive variance of v|y with the estimator
obtained from the Hessian matrix. To make this
comparison more explicit, let us denote τ(θ;y) =
V (v|θ;y) and e(θ;y) = vˆ(y)−E(v|θ;y). Then by the
law of iterated expectations (or the so-called EVE
formula) and noting that vˆ is determined by y, we
have
V (v|y) = V (vˆ− v|y)
(6.3)
= E[τ(θ;y)|y] + V [e(θ;y)|y],
V (vˆ − v|θ) = E[τ(θ;y)|θ] + V [e(θ;y)|θ].(6.4)
The authors’ argument seems to implicitly rely on a
“duality,” that is, the two mean terms on the right-
hand sides of (6.3) and (6.4) are (asymptotically or
approximately) the same; so are the two variance
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terms. That is, we can switch the required mean and
variance calculations under f(y|θ) in (6.3) to that
under f(θ|y) in (6.4). Fisher’s fiducial argument, as
far as I can understand, aimed to establish the va-
lidity of this switching on its own without viewing it
as an approximation to the Bayesian method (with
a constant prior). There is nothing wrong with in-
voking the fiducial argument (well, actually there
is but it depends on who one asks); indeed there
has been a recent surge of interest in it, especially
in connection with the “generalized confidence” ap-
proach [e.g., Hannig, Iyer and Patterson (2006) and
Hannig (2009)]. Perhaps the authors’ approach is
the next step, that is, using the fiducial approach
for prediction, not just for estimation. But without
being told explicitly about this switching, a reader’s
reaction would be anybody’s guess. A suspicion of
prestidigitation? A deja vu feeling of reading De-
ception Point instead of De Vinci Code? Or even
worse, an accusation of the prosecutor’s fallacy?
Finally, even if we buy the fiducial argument, it
does not follow that the left-hand side of (6.4) can
be well approximated by (an appropriate element
of) the inverse of the Hessian matrix because of the
non-negligibility of the R term, as discussed before.
The authors, of course, well recognized this, and
hence invoked the APHL method to approximate
(define?) the h-distribution f(v|y) instead of relying
on the normal approximation. While this approach
indeed “works well,” in the authors’ example and in
the example I am about to present, I have to put
“works well” in quotes when the success is judged
by comparing how close the h-distribution is to the
posterior predictive distribution under the constant
prior. But I’d be happy to remove the quotation
marks if the evaluation is based on the aforemen-
tioned pivotal predictive framework, because that
is a distinctive principle, regardless of whether one
subscribes to it or not.
7. SHOW AND TELL: ESTIMATION AND
PREDICTION WITH EXPONENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION
To illustrate various general points made in Sec-
tions 4–6, let us consider a simple case where the
data are an i.i.d. sample y = {y1, . . . , yn} from an
exponential distribution with mean λ with the unob-
servable being u= yn+1, a future observation. This
example is different from Bayarri’s two-level expo-
nential model because here we only have one level,
as in the authors’ Example 4. It is hard to have faith
in a method for multi-level hierarchical models if it
cannot handle single-level models.
7.1 Why does the Original Scale Fail?
As we discussed in Section 5.2, when the exponen-
tial variable u = yn+1 is used as the unobservable,
the Bartlett identities fail. In the current setting,
this can be seen directly by noting that (where y¯n
denotes the sample mean of {y1, . . . , yn})
h(λ,u;y) =−(n+1) logλ−
ny¯n + u
λ
,(7.1)
which clearly does not have an internal mode be-
cause it is linear in u≥ 0. Indeed, the h-score equa-
tion,
S(φ;y)≡


∂h
∂λ
∂h
∂u


(7.2)
=

−
n+1
λ
+
ny¯n + u
λ2
−
1
λ

=
(
0
0
)
,
leads to the meaningless estimator λˆ = +∞. Inci-
dently, this is also an example that Ih(θ), as defined
in (6.2), is not nonnegative definite because the sec-
ond Bartlett identity fails. Specifically, by further
differentiating the expressions in (7.2), it is easy to
verify that
Ih(θ) = E

−


n+ 1
λ2
− 2
ny¯n + u
λ3
1
λ2
1
λ2
0




=


n+ 1
λ2
−
1
λ2
−
1
λ2
0


which clearly fails to be nonnegative definite.
7.2 A Simple Transformation is All it Takes
However, when the h-likelihood uses v = log(u) as
unobservable, it satisfies both conditions of Theo-
rem 2 as verified in Section 5.2, so the correspond-
ing h-likelihood is Bartlized. To see this directly, be-
cause
h(λ, v;y) =−(n+1) logλ−
ny¯n + e
v
λ
+ v,(7.3)
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the h-score equation becomes
∂h
∂λ
=−
n+ 1
λ
+
ny¯n + e
v
λ2
= 0,
(7.4)
∂h
∂v
=−
ev
λ
+1 = 0.
This delivers the correct MLE for λ, λˆ= y¯n, and a
very sensible point prediction for the future obser-
vation, uˆ= evˆ = λˆ= y¯n.
Furthermore, the expected Hessian matrix is
Ih(λ) = Eλ

−


n+ 1
λ2
− 2
ny¯n + e
v
λ3
ev
λ2
ev
λ2
−
ev
λ




(7.5)
=


n+ 1
λ2
−
1
λ
−
1
λ
1

 .
It is easy to see that when evaluated at MLE
(=MHLE), λˆ, Ih(λˆ) is identical to the observed Hes-
sian matrix Iobsh =−
∂2h(φ;y)
∂φ2 |φ=φˆ
Iobsh ≡−


n+1
λˆ2
− 2
ny¯n + e
vˆ
λˆ3
evˆ
λˆ2
evˆ
λˆ2
−
evˆ
λ


(7.6)
=


n+1
λˆ2
−
1
λˆ
−
1
λˆ
1

 ,
where the equality holds because λˆ = y¯n = e
vˆ . The
fact that these two Hessian matrices coincide also
gives us another indication that the MHLE/Hessian
matrix can behave just like MLE/Fisher information
for regular exponential families.
7.3 So How Good is the Approximation?
Now let us examine the inverse of Ih(λ),
I−1h (λ) =


λ2
n
λ
n
λ
n
1 +
1
n

≡
(
τ2λ τλ,v
τλ,v τ
2
v
)
.(7.7)
If the R term in (6.1) is negligible, then the above
matrix should provide the (asymptotic) value of
Vλ(φˆ− φ) where φ= {λ, v} and the variance opera-
tor Vλ is with respect to the joint sampling distri-
bution fλ(y, v). Clearly, τ
2
λ = λ
2/n is exactly right
because it is Vλ(λˆ). To examine the other entries,
we first recall that for large n, Taylor’s expansion
(i.e., the δ-method) justifies the approximation
log(y¯n)− log(λ)≈
y¯n − λ
λ
≡ zn.(7.8)
Adopting this approximation, and noting that v =
log(yn+1) is independent of y¯n given λ, we have
Covλ(λˆ, vˆ− v) = Covλ(y¯n, log(y¯n))
(7.9)
≈ Covλ(y¯n, zn) =
λ
n
which is the same as τλ,v.
Similarly, by (7.8), Vλ(log(y¯n))≈ V (zn) = 1/n, and
hence we have
Vλ(vˆ − v) = Vλ(log(y¯n)) + Vλ(log(yn+1))
(7.10)
≈
1
n
+ Vλ(log(yn+1)).
This would be the same as τ2v if Vλ(log(yn+1)) = 1.
But unfortunately this is where the MHLE/Hessian
matrix approximation breaks down. One can directly
verify or use the property of Gumbel distribution
(recall log of an exponential variable is a Gumbel
variable) to arrive at
Vλ(log(yn+1)) =
π2
6
= 1.6449. . .(7.11)
which is considerably larger than 1. [Incidentally, the
integrating moment generating function approach
(Meng, 2005) can be used to calculate Vλ(log(y¯n))
exactly for general n, if needed.]
7.4 So What Works and What Does Not?
To see more clearly what went wrong, let us write
out the R term in (6.1) explicitly for the current
model. Using (7.4) and (7.7), simple algebra reveals
that (6.1) becomes(
λˆ− λ
vˆ− v
)
≡
(
y¯n − λ
log(y¯n)− log(yn+1)
)
(7.12)
=
(
y¯n − λ
y¯n − yn+1
λ
)
+
(
0
Rv,n
)
,
where Rv,n obviously makes up the difference be-
tween vˆ−v and (y¯n−yn+1)/λ, but it would be more
useful to express it in the equivalent form
Rv,n =
[
log
(
y¯n
λ
)
−
y¯n − λ
λ
]
(7.13)
−
[
log
(
yn+1
λ
)
−
yn+1− λ
λ
]
.
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From these expressions, we see that the MHLE/
Hessian matrix approach works perfectly for the es-
timation of λ—it is the same as MLE and with
the correct variance estimator because its R term
is exactly zero. However, for the prediction of v,
two things went wrong, and both are due to the
failure of accumulation of information. First, Rv,n
is not negligible compared with the leading term
Zv,n = (y¯n − yn+1)/λ. Indeed, as n→∞, Rv,n →
R∞ = ξ − 1− log(ξ) and Zv,n → Z∞ = 1− ξ where
ξ is an exponential variable with mean one. In fact,
while E(Z∞) = 0, E(R∞) is far from zero, taking
the value of Euler’s constant, γ = 0.5772 . . . . This
failure obviously is due to the nonapplicability of
the Taylor expansion (7.8) when n= 1; if this were
applicable, then V (log(yn+1)) = V (v) would be ap-
proximated by V (zn) = 1, leading to τ
2
v = 1+
1
n for
V (vˆ− v) in (7.7).
Second, although Z∞ has mean zero and vari-
ance one, its density function f(z) = ez−1, with sup-
port (−∞,1], is far from that of the normal. Indeed,
f(1)/φ(1) > 5, where φ(z) is the p.d.f. of N(0,1).
But of course the distribution of Z∞ or Zv,n is not
even relevant because we cannot use either of them
to approximate the sampling distribution of vˆ − v
due to the nonnegligibility of Rv,n.
7.5 3-in-1: Pivotal Predictive Distribution,
Posterior Predictive Distribution, and
H-distribution
The exact distribution of vˆ − v, of course, can
be worked out easily in this case. But it is impor-
tant to emphasize that by moving from the orig-
inal u = yn+1 scale to the v = log(yn+1) scale, we
have obtained a predictive pivotal quantity. That
is, whereas the sampling distribution of u − uˆ =
yn+1 − y¯n depends on the unknown λ, the distri-
bution of v − vˆ = log(yn+1/y¯n) is free of λ because
it is canceled in the ratio as the scale parameter.
Consequently, the v scale provides us a way to con-
struct exact prediction intervals without having to
worry about λ which is a nuisance parameter for
the purposes of prediction. This is simply the pre-
dictive version of the usual inference of parameter
of interest based on a pivotal quantity. Although
such a construction is by nature a frequentist one,
it should help to understand the importance of the
choice of scale of the unobservables for the authors’
approach. Evidently, this consideration of pivotal
quantity greatly restricts the family of scales for
unobservables, beyond the minimal requirement of
preserving the (first two) Bartlett identities, as dis-
cussed in Section 5.
Indeed, it is informative to compare the three dis-
tributions here: (I) the sampling distribution fλ(vˆ−
v), (II) the posterior predictive distribution fB(v|y)
under constant prior and (III) the h-distribution
fH(v|y) derived from the authors’ APHL method.
For (I), because Un =
∑n
i=1 yi ∼Gamma(n,λ) is in-
dependent of u= yn+1 ∼Gamma(1, λ), we know the
ratio Bn = Un/(Un+ u) is distributed as Beta(n,1).
Consequently, r = yn+1/y¯n = n(B
−1
n − 1) follows a
Pareto distribution of order n+1, that is,
f(r) =
(
1 +
r
n
)−(n+1)
, r≥ 0(7.14)
which converges to e−r as n → ∞, as it should.
[The distribution f(r) obviously determines the dis-
tribution of v− vˆ = log(r).]
In comparison, for (II), because f(y1, . . . , yn|λ)∝
λ−ne−Un/λ, a posteriori we can write λ = Unγ
−1,
where γ ∼Gamma(n− 1,1). Consequently, because
u = λξ where ξ ∼ Gamma(1,1) and is independent
of γ, a posteriori we have u=Un(ξ/γ). This implies
r ≡ nu/Un = nξ/γ = n(B˜n−1 − 1) where B˜n−1 ∼
Beta(n − 1,1); here we assume n > 1 as the pos-
terior is improper when n = 1 under the constant
prior on λ. It follows that
fB(r|y) =
n− 1
n
(
1 +
r
n
)−n
, r ≥ 0.(7.15)
For (III), we note from the first equation of (7.4)
that for any given v, the h-likelihood is maximized
at
λ(v) =
ny¯n+ e
v
n+ 1
.(7.16)
From (7.3), the log profile h-likelihood then becomes,
ignoring irrelevant constants,
hλ(v;y) =−(n+ 1) logλ(v) + v.(7.17)
Using the authors’ notation and (7.5), D(h,λ) =
−∂
2h(λ,v:y)
∂λ2
= (n + 1)/λ2 when λ = λ(v), and hence
the authors’ (log) adjusted profile h-likelihood be-
comes, again ignoring irrelevant constants,
h˜λ(v;y) =−(n+1) logλ(v) + v
− 12 log(D(h,λ(v)))(7.18)
=−n logλ(v) + v.
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The h-distribution for v then, as I understand from
the authors’ approach, is to set
fH(v|y)∝ eh˜λ(v;y)
(7.19)
= evλ−n(v)∝ ev(Un + e
v)−n.
Converting this to the distribution of r = nu/Un =
nev/Un and re-normalizing it to be a proper distri-
bution, we have, again assuming n> 1,
fH(r|y) =
n− 1
n
(
1 +
r
n
)−n
, r ≥ 0(7.20)
which is identical to the posterior predictive distri-
bution (7.15). This is expected because of the ac-
curacy of the Laplace approximation (and by re-
normalizing we eliminate the remaining approxima-
tion inaccuracy).
7.6 The Need of Choosing the Right Scale for
the Fixed Parameter
A perceptive reader may realize that the small dif-
ference between (7.14) and (7.15) or (7.20), although
of little practical consequence, nevertheless points to
a deeper issue. Indeed, if we use the constant prior
on log(λ), the most common “noninformative” prior
for scale parameter, then fB(r|y) will be the same
as f(r) of (7.14). This suggests an intimate connec-
tion between posterior prediction and the pivotal
approach on the joint space of {y, v}.
For h-likelihood, we have seen that choosing the
right scale for the unobservable is crucial. However,
the scale of the parameter also plays a role, espe-
cially for the adjusted profile h-likelihood because
the value of D(h,α) depends on the scale of α. For
example, in the current example, if we also choose
the log scale for λ, that is, use h(η, v;y) to carry out
all the h-likelihood calculations where η = log(λ),
then D(h, η) = n+1. Consequently, the adjustment
becomes immaterial, making the log APHL the same
as (7.17), the original profiled log h-likelihood. This
is easily seen to lead to
fH(r|y) =
(
1 +
r
n
)−(n+1)
, r≥ 0,(7.21)
which is now identical to the pivotal predictive dis-
tribution f(r) in (7.14), a truly 3-in-1!
This equivalence not only demonstrates the inti-
mate connection among the three methods, but also
suggest the possibility of providing a probabilistic
meaning to h-distributions, at least in some cases.
For example, under (7.14), a 1− α highest density
predictive (HDP) interval is of the form
HDP = [0, c(α,n)y¯n],(7.22)
where c(α,n) = n(α−1/n − 1)→− log(α).
This interval has both Bayesian interpretation and
frequentist interpretation, the latter of which I be-
lieve is closer to what the authors have been seeking.
The frequentist interpretation is simply that among
repeated samples of {y1, . . . , yn, yn+1}, the HDP in
(7.22) covers yn+1 with frequency/probability 1 −
α. Such interpretation perhaps is more appealing
to some than its posterior predictive interpretation
which in this case is actually not directly realizable
with random λ because it is derived under the im-
proper prior π(λ) ∝ λ−1. It is somewhat intriguing
that this un-realizable posterior predictive distribu-
tion via random λ is easily realizable via the pivotal
predictive distribution. A general investigation of
this connection may offer new insights into both the
similarities and differences between Bayesian and
sampling inferences.
8. EPILOGUE
Dan Brown concluded Angels and Demons with
Dr. Langdon’s religious experience with Vittoria,
a yoga master. Although my pleasure is at an en-
tirely different level, I must confess that my study
of the h-likelihood framework is largely carried by
both the authors’ faith in their methods and my
faith in the authors—they must have seen signs that
most discussants did not. My Bayesian half urged
me every weekend to seek Dr. Langdon’s ambigram
of “H,” yet my other half kept seducing me with
promises of hidden treasures. Indeed, a posteriori
I am willing to move all probability from (V) to
(IV), as well as to increase the probability of (II)
over 50%, provided that we are always mindful of
another “H” for h-likelihood—its Achilles’ Heel—
the potential (and often) non-negligibility of the R
term. The Bartlizability and pivotal predictive inter-
pretation of the h-likelihood methods could seduce
someone to speculate that the “H” is The Lost Sym-
bol, the eagerly awaited new thriller of Dan Brown.
As a matter of fact, since I have already been se-
duced for the past five weekends, far exceeding the
originally planned 3-day excursion, I may as well en-
joy my earned fantasy, a spoonful of my colleague
Dr. Langdon’s new experience, divine or not. . . .
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